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JURISDICTION
This
Annotated,

Petition

35-1-83

is brought

pursuant

(1953, as amqnded

to

Utah

Code

1987) which confers

original jurisdiction in such motion^ for review on the Utah
Court of Appeals.
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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This Petitition is for review of a final order of the
Utah

State

Industrial

Commission.

The

Findings

of Fact,

Conclusions of Law, and Order by the Administrative Law Judge of
the

Industrial

(Exhibit "A"),

Commission

were

entered

March

4, 1987,

A Motion for Review was filed by the Workmens'

Compensation Fund of Utah on March 5, 1987,

(Exhibit "B") which

was denied by the Industrial Commission by Order dated April 1,
1987,

(Exhibit "D"). A Motion for Review was filed by the

Petitioner/Applicant on March 18, 1987,

(Exhibit "C") which

Motion was denied by order of the Commission dated June 24, 1987,
(Exhibit "E").

It is the findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,

and Order that has been upheld by the Industrial Commission that
is the subject of this Appeal.
ISSUES
This case involves the application of Section 35-1-69,
Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), which requires the Second
Injury Fund to compensate employees for disability resulting from
pre-existing

conditions where a new injury either directly

aggravates the pre-existing condition or results in an additional
10% permanent partial disability and total permanent partial
disability from the industrial injury and pre-existing conditions
is 20% or greater.

In the instant case, an employee experienced

two industrial incidents on separate days while working for the
same employer.

These two incidents cumulatively resulted in
2

medical

treatment

and a disability of

10%.

However, this

cumulative disability can be broken down so that each incident is
deemed to have contributed less than 10% to the employee's total
disability. The issue then is:

should this 10% disability serve

to trigger the requirements of Section

35-1-69, and require

compensation to the injured employee from the Second Injury Fund
for his pre-existing conditions.
FACTS
The applicant/appellant Laverne Lawrence, was employed
by Gann Brothers, Inc. as a truck driver operating a heavy
equipment transporter.

On September X0, 1985, while attempting

to lift the access ramp to a flat-bed trailer that was designed
for

carrying heavy equipment, he wrenched his back and had

immediate low back pain in the vicinity of his belt line.

Mr.

Lawrence reported the incident, but sought no medical treatment,
lost no time from work, and received no benefits pursuant to the
Workers' Compensation statute.
While working for the same employer, on November 29,
1985, the applicant/appellant was again required to lift the
loading ramp of his flat-bed trailer.

As he did so he felt pain

again in the same location in his low back.

He reported the

incident and received medical treatment from a chiropracter for
approximately one week.

These treatments were paid for by his
3

Workers' Compensation

Insurance.

On February

18, 1986, Mr.

Lawrence's back became worse and he was ordered not to work by
his physician.

He was diagnosed as having a herniated disc, and

on March 20, 1986, the disc at L3-4 was removed by Dr. Heiden at
St. Benedict's Hospital in Ogden, Utah.
After a hearing, the medical issues were referred to a
medical

panel

by

the Administrative Law Judge.

The Panel

determined, and the Administrative Law Judge found, that as a
result of these two industrial incidents and the surgery of
March

20, 1986, the applicant had incurred

a total of 10%

permanent partial impairment. The Panel allocated 6.7% to the
November incident and 3.3% to the September incident.
The Panel found that the applicant had a pre-existing
laminectomy resulting in a 10% whole person disability, and a 5%
whole person disability due to the removal of cartilege in his
left knee.
November

The Panel found that neither the September nor the
injuries

aggravated

either

of

these

pre-existing

conditions.
Based upon these findings the Administrative Law Judge
determined that neither the September nor the November incidents
aggravated a pre-existing condition, and that neither, by itself,
resulted in an additional 10% permanent partial impairment,
4

therefore the provisions of Section 35H-69, were not applicable
and the Second Injury Fund was not Required to compensate the
applicant for his pre-existing disability.
Gann

Brothers, Inc. was

fLnsured by

the Workers'

Compensation Fund of Utah at the tim^ of the September injury,
but was uninsured at the time of the November injury, and later
filed for protection in the Bankruptcy Court.

As a result, the

Administrative Law Judge ruled that the Workers' Compensation
Fund

of

Utah was liable for 3.3% of the medical expenses,

permanent partial disability, and temporary total disability and
that the Uninsured Employers Fund wa£ responsible for 6.7% of
those expenses.

The Second Injury Ftind was deemed to have no

liability.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The purpose of the provisions of Section 35-1-69, to
encourage

employers

to

hire

individuals

withpre-existing

disabilities, is best served by finding that the 10% permanent
partial disability that results from these two intimately related
industrial incidents satisfies the requirement of that section
and mandates compensation by the Second Injury Fund.
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There are three possible ways of dealing with the
events described in this case:
A.

The events can be seen as two separate injuries.

One occurring on September 10,, 1985, and the second occurring on
November 29, 1985.
B.

The events can be seen as a single injury that

cumulatively resulted in a failure on November 10, 1985, and the
need for surgery, a medical panel having allocated one-third of
the responsibility for the surgery and subsequent disability to
the September incident and two-thirds of the responsibility to
the November incident.
C.

The incidents can be viewed as one industrial

injury occurring on November 29, 1985, that was preceded by an
event on September

10, 1985, that does not come up to the

standard required for an industrial injury, and is therefore a
pre-existing condition.
The Industrial Commission in its ruling, upholding the
Administrative
approach

Law Judge's

decision, appear to have taken

"A" to this situation, holding that there were two

separate industrial injuries neither of which comes up to the
required standard of producing a 10% permanent partial disability
and invoking the compensation to the injured worker provided for
in Section 69. For the reasons stated below, the ruling is in
6

error in its interpretation of Section 35-1-69 and is arbitrary
and capricious in its application of Section 69 to the facts in
this case.
ARGUIfflWr
POINT I
THE PURPOSE OF THE SECOND INJURY FUND, TO ENCOURAGE
EMPLOYERS TO HIRE PERSONS WITH PRE-EXISTING
DISABILITIES. IS BEST SERVED BY TREATING"THE INCIDENTS
OF SEPTEMBER 11, AND NOVEMBER 29. 1985. AS A SINGLE
INJURY FOR PURPOSES OF APPLICATION OF SECTION 35-1-69.
Under the first paragraph of Section 35-1-69 (1), the
Second Injury Fund is to compensate an employer for pre-existing
conditions if a new injury either

(^)

aggravates that pre-

existing condition or

(b) meets the threshold requirement that

the

an

new

injury

disability,

and

add
that

additional

the new

10% permanent

partial

injufcy plus the pre-existing

conditions result in a total permanent partial disability of 20%.
Section 35-1-69 (1), Utah Code Annotated.

The principal case

interpreting this issue is
The Second Injury Fund v. Streator Chevroletf 709 P.2d 1176.
Here the court gives a thorough anapLysis of the history and
purposes of the Second Injury Fund and of the provisions of
Section 69. The court states as follows regarding the purpose of
Section 35-1-69:
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"The legislature undoubtedly intended...
to provide protection for men who had
already been partially permanently
disabled, but yet were able to do work.
Without some provision of this kind,
employers would be extremely hesitant in
employing men partially disabled, since
an injury resulting in partial permanent
disability of the employee might well
impose greater liability on the employer than
a similar injury incurred by a person not
previously disabled." Second Injury Fund
v. Streator Chevolet, 709 P.2d 1176, 1179,
quoting from Marker v. Industrial Commission,
37 P.2d 785, 787 (1934) .
In this case Mr. Lawrence was already employed, even
though he had pre-existing back and knee disabilities.

At least

in theory the purpose of Section 35-1-69 had been served, as the
employer and his insurer could rest assured that they would not
be held liable for any disability resulting from his pre-existing
conditions.
After the incident that occurred on September 10, 1985,
Mr. Lawrence had obviously had an insult to his back.

However,

this insult had not required any medical treatment or resulted in
any lost work or disability.

It is common knowledge among

employers that once an individual has had an insult to his back,
an additional injury is more probable and such injury is likely
to result

in significant disability.

An employer might be

inclined to dismiss Mr. Lawrence after such an insult to his back
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to avoid being liable for this additional injury and subsequent
disability.

Surely it is an obvious corollary to the stated

purpose of Section
protections

69 and the Second Injury Fund, that the

provided

by the Fund should be extended

to an

individual who is already employed.
These protections can be so extended by finding that
any insult that occurred on September 10, 1985, is itself a preexisting condition to the November 29, 1985, event that triggered
the medical expenses and disability.

Or, this purpose could be

supported by finding that since the fijrst injury itself did

not

require any medical treatment, that, standing alone, it is not
itself an "industrial injury", and does not become an injury
until the second occurrence on November 29, 1985.

But for the

November 29th injury, there would h&ve been no necessity of
medical treatment or other compensation for the
September 10th incident.

But for the November 29th injury, there

would have been no surgery, no lost wages, and no permanent
partial disability.
POINT II
IT IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS TO HOLD THAT THE
SEPTEMBER 10, AND NOVEMBER 29\. 1985, INCIDENTS
REPRESENT TWO SEPARATE INJURIES FOR PURPOSES OF THE
APPLICATION OF SECTION 35-1-^9, REGARDING THE
COMPENSATION OF AN INJURED EMPLOYEE.
The court in its discussion of the purpose of the
9

Second Injury Fund and the history of Section 69 in
Streator Chevrolet, points out that prior to 1981, the statute
required

that

the permanent

incapacity

resulting

from the

combined impairments be "substantially greater" than would have
been the case had there been no pre-existing incapacity.

In

1981, the statute was amended so as to give precise definition to
the term "substantially greater".
and

20% threshold

requirement.

Thus, giving rise to the 10%
The court interpreted this

threshold as "...no combination of impairments shall be deemed to
be substantially greater, than the industrial injury impairment
alone, unless the industrial injury impairment is 10% or more and
the total impairment from all combined causes is 20% or more,
Second Injury Fund v. Streator Chevrolet, 709 P.2d 1176, 1181
(Utah 1985).

In ruling that these percentage thresholds were to

be met based on the whole man rather than the partial man
disability schedule, the court focused on the fact that "The
amendments to Section 35-1-69, set the 10% and 20% thresholds in
order to assure that both the industrial injury and the total
impairments reach certain fixed levels of seriousness before any
non-aggravating

pre-existing

impairments

are

compensated."

Second Injury Fund v. Streator Chevrolet, 709 P.2d 1176, 1181,
(Emphasis ours).

The court goes on to point out that to rule
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otherwise, "... would unfairly deny compensation to those who are
most

handicapped

while granting

ii to the

less

severely

handicapped."
Thus the court has made cl|ear that the controlling
principle in interpreting these thresholds, is the seriousness of
the injury and the compensatory purpose of the statute.

Given

these principles, it is arbitrary and capricious to rule that the
two incidents that occurred to Mr. Lawrence on September 10, and
November 29, 1985, are in fact two separate injuries.

Such a

ruling serves no purpose other than td avoid the application of
the compensation provisions of Sectioh 35-1-69 (1), and thwart
the purposes of the statute.

It is arbitrary to find that the

September insult to the back was in fact an industrial injury for
purposes of this section.

The applicant did not require any

medical treatment or lose any time froiti work as a result of what
happened on September 10, 1985.

Although what occurred was

clearly a reportable accident, had there not been a further
insult to his back, no compensation ir} any form would have been
paid.
Indeed, since the September 1|0, 1985, injury would have
resulted in no compensation had it not been for the "lighting up"
that resulted from the November 29, 1985, injury this case can be
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seen as quite similar to the internal failure cases analyzed by
the court in Allen v. The Industrial Commission, 729 P. 2d 15
(Utah 1986) .
The only meaningful difference between the instant case
and these gradually developing, internal back failure cases, is
that here we have only a single reported incident of pain that
pre-existed the final failure in the back.

Whereas, in the more

gradual cases there are many insults to the back that precede the
"last straw" accident.

In the internal failure cases no issue is

raised

each

arguing

that

prior incident where the injured

employee may have experience prior back pain should be considered
itself as a separate industrial accident.

No one suggests that

the percentage of disability should be broken down and allocated
to each one of these incidents as well as the final accident.
Such an analysis would be completely unworkable.

In such cases

as these, under the Allen analysis, we say that there is one
industrial accident that occurs on the date and time of the
accident that brings on the internal failure, and we use the
whole

man

disability

percentage

that

results

from

treatment and

subsequent to this last accident in applying the

threshold requirements of Section 35-1-69
meaningful

the

distinction

between

gradually developing cases.
12

the

(1).

There is no

instant case and these

POINT III

THE MEDICAL ALLOCATION OF DISABILITY BETWEEN THE
SEPTEMBER AND NOVEMBER INCIDENTS SHOULD BE USED TO
ALLOCATE LIABILITY AMONG THE VARIOUS INSURANCE
COMPANIES AND COMPENSATION FUNDS, NOT TO THWART THE
COMPENSATORY INTENT OF SECTION 35-1-69.
Section 35-1-69 (1) presents two separate problems that
have been treated quite differently by the Utah Supreme Court
decisions.

The first has to do wit}i compensating an injured

employee where the new injury either aggravates a pre-existing
condition or meets the required threshold of severity.

The

second issue involves the proper apportionment of compensation
between the employer and the Second Injury Fund to meet the
stated purpose of the Second Injury Fund that "the liability of
the

employer

for compensation. . .shall be for the industrial

injury only and the remainder shall be paid out of the Second
Injury Fund", Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-69 fl).
The issue of allocation of liability has been threshed
out

by

the Utah

Supreme

Court

Construction v. Hair, 667 P.2d 25,
Torqerson, 773 P. 2d 178.

in the

cases

of

Jacobsen

and Richfield Care Center v.

Hair stands for the proposition that

for purposes of meeting the requirements of Section 69, it is
appropriate to use a different form of disability ratina than
13

that used for determining the amount of compensation due the
applicant.

For purposes of compensating

an applicant, the

"combined partial impairment" rating based upon the
American Medical Association Conversion Tables is used.

These

tables combine the percentages of impairment attributable to the
individual injuries so as "to avoid the possibility, in some
cases, of separate whole man percentages adding up to a total
impairment

in excess

of

100%."

However, for apportioning

liability between the employer and the Second Injury Fund, the
"whole man" rating is to be used.

Jacobsen Construction v Hair

667 P.2d 25, 27.
Torgerson

applies Hair in the situation where two

injuries occurring at different times both contributed to the
aggravation

of a pre-existing

condition.

In Torgerson the

applicant was found to have had a pre-existing condition, prior
to any industrial injury, that involved a whole man impairment of
2.5%.

Then in 1980, the applicant had an industrial injury that

required medical treatment and resulted in an additional 2.5%
whole man

impairment.

In 1982, the applicant had another

industrial injury that resulted in an additional 2.5% permanent
partial impairment.

The Commission ruled that Hair stood for the

proposition that, "...the employer's portion of the liability for
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compensation is equal to the percentage of the permanent physical
impairment attributable to the industrial injury.

Thus, the

Commission must consider separate accidents serially in order to
determine

the percentage of impairment attributable to each

accident and the proportion the pre-exjLsting impairment bears to
the

total

combined

impairment."

Richfield

Care Center v

Torqerson, 773 P.2d 178,180.
Thus, the court went on to apportion liability for the
1980 accident which had aggravated the first 2.5% impairment and
added an additional 2.5%, one-half to the Second Injury Fund and
one-half to the employer.

The court abplied these principles to

the 1982 injury by treating the 5% permanent partial impairment
that the applicant brought to this injury as a pre-existing
impairment. When the 1982 injury added an additional 2.5%
permanent partial impairment to the 5% pre-existing impairment,
the allocation was one-third to the employer and two-thirds to
the Second Injury Fund.

Thus, for purposes of allocation, the

first industrial accident and the impairment resulting from it
became

a pre-existing

condition

of

the

second

industrial

accident.
Despite ruling that the pre-existing industrial injury
is a pre-existing condition for purposes of allocation under
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Section 35-1-69 (1), the court ruled in David v. The Industrial
Commission of Utah, 649 P. 2d 82, that a prior industrial injury
that

had

already been compensated, was not a

"pre-existing

condition" such that compensation from the Second Injury Fund was
required under Section 35-1-69.
Thus, the court rulings make it quite clear that it is
necessary to treat the issue of compensation to the employee and
apportionment

between

employers

and

injury

funds

quite

differently.
CONCLUSION
Since

the

creation of the Second

Injury Fund two

central principles have guided the case law interpreting the
purposes of The Fund and the statuatory rules governing it.
First, to encourage employers to hire workers with pre-existing
conditions by assuring them that they will be liable only for
those injuries and disabilities that are associated with their
employment, and secondly to encourage workers with pre-existing
disabilities to find work by assuring them that they will be
compensated for all their disabilities should a new injury result
in a sufficiently severe total disability.
the court to apply these guiding principles

This case requires
where an employee

experienced two industrial injury incidents while working for the
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same employer, the first one requiring no medical treatment or
compensation of any kind, and the second one resulting in an
internal failure to the back.

The most rational way to deal with

these incidents and the only way that Rationally applies both of
these guiding principles to these fact^, is to find that the two
incidents resulted in a single disability of sufficient severity
to justify compensating the injured worker for the new injury and
his pre-existing disabilities as requirled by Section 35-1-69.
To find that the two insults to the injured workers
back

represent

two

separate injuries arbitrarily divides a

disability that would only have exis|ted as a result of both
events, and thwarts the second purpos^ of the existence of the
Second Injury Fund.
pre-existing
purposes

of

To find that the first injury represents a

condition as to the second injury thwarts both
the Second

Injury Func}, since the employer is

relieved of responsibility for an injury that occurred while the
employee was working

for him

and

the

compensation for his total disability.

employee

is denied

Where, in reality, that

total disability meets the required levtel of severity.
To interpret the two closely related insults to the
back

as

a

single

industrial

injury

for

purposes

of the

application of the thresholds of Section 35-1-69, both satisfies
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the two primary concerns of the existence of the Second Injury
Fund and of Section 69, and brings the interpretation of these
incidents in accord with the medical events and with the court's
reasoning

in

its

interpretation

of internal

failure cases.

Accordingly, petitioner/applicant prays that this court
order the Industrial Commission to amend its ruling of June 24,
1987, upholding the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of
the Administrative Law Judge, and Order the Commission to enter
new Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, holding;

(a)

that

the industrial injury/incident of September 10, 1985, and
November 29, 1985, cumulatively resulted in a permanent partial
disability to the petitioner/applicant of 10%;

(b)

that this

represents a permanent partial disability that is "substantially
greater" than the permanent partial disability that pre-existed
these events;

and, that since the pre-existing permanent partial

impairment of the petitioner/applicant is in excess of 10% that
the conditions set forth in Section 35-1-69 are satisfied;

and,

that the Commission order the Second Injury Fund to compensate
the petitioner/applicant for his pre-existing disability.
DATED this 21st day of December, 1987.
Respectfully submitted,

LEROY K. JO^SOJ^r>
Attorney for Petitioner/Applicant
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ADDENDUM
Statute 35-1-69, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended)
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
Workmen's Compensation Fund: Motion for Review
Petitioner/Applicant:

Motion for Review

Workmen's Compensation Fund:
Denial of Motion for Review
Petitioner/Applicant: Denial of Motion for Review ....
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Training of employee.
(l) If any employee who has previously incurred a permanent incapacity by
accidental injury, disease, or congenital causes J sustains an industrial injury
for which either compensation or medical caret or both, is provided by this
chapter that results in permanent incapacity Which is substantially greater
than he would have incurred if he had not had the pre-existing incapacity, or
which aggravates or is aggravated by such pre-etristing incapacity, compensation, medical care, and other related items as outlined in Section 35-1-81,
shall be awarded on the basis of the combined injuries, but the liability of the
employer for such compensation, medical care, jind other related items shall
be for the industrial injury only. The remainder shall be paid out of the
Second Injury Fund provided for in Subsection 3^-1-68 (1), and shall be determined after assigning the impairment for the industrial injury on a whole
person uncombined basis and then deducting t|iis percentage from the total
combined rating. This combined impairment rating may not exceed 100%.
For purposes of this section, (a) any aggravation of a pre-existing injury,
disease, or congenital cause shall be deemed "substantially greater", and compensation, medical care, and other related items shall be awarded on the basis
of the combined injuries as provided in this Subsection (1), and (b) where there
is no such aggravation, no award for combined injuries may be made unless
the percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable to the industrial injury is 10% or greater and the percentage of permanent physical impairment resulting from all causes and conditions, including the industrial
injury, is greater than 20%. In determining thi impairment thresholds and
assessment of liability in favor of the employee! and apportionment between
the carrier or employer and the Second Injury Fund, the permanent physical
impairment attributable to the industrial injury or the pre-existing condition
or overall impairment, shall be considered on a whole person uncombined
basis. If the pre-existing incapacity referred to hi this Subsection (l)(b) previously has been compensated for, in whole or in part, as a permanent partial
disability under this chapter or Chapter 2, Titl|e 35, the Utah Occupational
Disease Disability Law, such compensation shall be deducted from the liability assessed to the Second Injury Fund under this paragraph.
If the payment of temporary disability benefits, medical expenses, or othe.
related items are required as a result of the industrial injury subiect to thi*
section, the employer or its insurance carrier snail be responsible for all such
temporary benefits, medical care, or other related Items up to the end of the
period of temporary total disability resulting from the industrial injury. Any
allocation of disability benefits, medical care, or other related items following
such period shall be made between the employer or its insurer and the Second
Injury Fund as provided for in this section, and any payments made by the
employer or its insurance carrier in excess of itp proportionate share shall be
recoverable at the time of the award for combined disabilities if any is made.
A medical panel having the qualifications of (the medical panel set forth in
Section 35-2-56, shall review all medical aspects of the case and determine
first, the total permanent physical impairment resulting from all causes and
conditions including the industrial injury; second, the percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable to the industrial injury; and third, the
percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable to the previously
existing condition, whether due to accidental injury, disease, or congenital
causes. The Industrial Commission shall then assess the liability for permanent partial disability compensation and future medical care to the employer
on the basis of the percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable
to the industrial injury only and any amounts remaining to be paid shall be
payable out of the Second Injury Fund. Medical expenses shall be paid in the
first instance by the employer or its insurance carrier. Amounts, if any, which
have been paid by the employer in excess of the portion attributable to the
industrial injury shall be reimbursed to the employer out of the Second Injury
Fund upon written request and verification pf amounts so expended.
(2) The commission may increase the weekly compensation rates to be paid
out of this special fund. This increase shall be i|ised for the rehabilitation and
training of any employee coming under this chapter as may be certified to the
commission by the Rehabilitation Department c^f the State Board of Education
as being eligible for rehabilitation and training. There may not be paid out of
such special fund for rehabilitation ail amoujit in excess of $1,000.
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Sixteen years ago, the Applicant started having back problems after
he got out of the service. He eventually received a laminectomy at the L4-5
level at the St. Francis Hospital of Topeka, Kansas.
With the file in this posture, the case was referred to a Medical
Panel for its evaluation. The Medical Panel found that the surgery of March
20, 1986, was 2/3 the result of the industrial accident of November 29, 1985,
and 1/3 the result of the industrial injury of September 10, 1985. The Panel
concluded that these two injuries amounted to a new insult to the Applicant's
back at a different location. The Panel also found that Mr. Lawrence reached
a fixed state of recovery following his surgery of March 20, 1986, on October
20, 1986. As a result of the industrial accident of November 29, 1985, the
Panel found a 6.7% permanent impairment due to the whole person, and a 3.3%
permanent partial impairment of the whole person due to the industrial
accident of September 10, 1985. With respect to the pre-existing laminectomy,
the Panel found a 10% whole person rating as a result of that problem, and a
5% whole person rating due to the Applicant's pre-existing surgical removal of
cartilage in his left knee due to a football injury of 1979. Finally, the
Panel found that neither the industrial injury of September 10, 1985, nor
November 29, 1985, aggravated a pre-existing condition. The Administrative
Law Judge adopts the findings of the Medical Panel as his own.
Pursuant to the findings of the Medical Panel, the Applicant is
entitled to receive payment for the surgery of March 20, 1986, with 2/3 of
that surgery being the responsibility of Gann Brothers, Inc., since they were
uninsured on November 29, 1985, and 1/3 of those expenses are the responsibility of the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah. In addition, the Applicant
is entitled to temporary total compensation for the period February 18, 1986,
through October 20, 1986, or a period of 35 weeks. As indicated previously,
he is entitled to a 6.7% permanent partial impairment award of the whole
person from his employer, Gann Brothers, Inc., and a 3.3% permanent partial
impairment of the whole person from the Workers Compensation Fund. Pursuant
to Section 35-1-69, the Second Injury Fund has no involvement in this case
since there is vo indication of any aggravation of a pre-existing condition by
either of the industrial accidents, and further there is no satisfaction of
the threshold requirement contained in Section 69. For the record, that
Section requires that Second Injury Fund participation will be indicated if
there is a 10% impairment of the whole person due to an industrial accident
and an impairment of 20% or greater of the whole person from all causes and
conditions including the industrial accident. In this case, the Applicant has
sustained a 6.7% impairment of the whole person due to the industrial accident
of November 29, 1985, and 3.3% impairment of the whole person due to the
industrial injury of September 10, 1985, neither of which standing separately
satisfies the threshold requirement.
At the evidentiary hearing of these matters, it was indicated by the
Administrator of the Uninsured Employers Fund that the employer, Gann Brothers,
Inc., has filed a Chapter VII Bankruptcy. Accordingly, pursuant to Section
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EXHIBIT "A"

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah,
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on September
1986, at 10:00 o'clock a.m.; same being pursuant
Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Tirothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

LaVeme H. Lawrence was present and
Lennard Stillman, Attorney at Law.
Gann Brothers, Inc., did not appear.
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35-1-107, the Administrative Law Judge finds and Iconiudes that Gann Brothers,
Inc., has insufficient assets to pay the Applicant's claim for the industrial
accident of November 29, 1935, and they were uninsured for workers compensation
purposes on that date. Accordingly, the Uninsured Employers Fund is liable
for the Applicant's benefits which are due ana owing as a result of his
industrial accident of November 29, 1985. With Respect to the payment of the
medical expenses for the surgery of March 20, 1986, the Administrative Law
Judge finds that as a matter of convenience, those bills should be paid in the
first instance in full by the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah. The Workers
Compensation Fund of Utah shall then be entitled to reimbursement from the
Uninsured Employers Fund for 6 7% of the medicjai expenses incurred as the
result of the surgery of March 20, 1 0 Q 6
On September 10, 1985, and November 29|, 1985, it would appear that
the Applicant was earning 59.00 per hour, working forty hours per week, and he
was single with no dependents, thereby entitling him to temporary total
compensation in the amount of $240.00 per week, and permanent partial
impairment benefits in the amount of the statutory maximum of $215.00 per week.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
LaVeme H. Lawrence sustained compensable industrial accidents on
September 10, 1985, and November 29, 1985, while employed by Gann Brothers,
Inc. .

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants, Gann Brothers, Inc., and/or
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, pay LaVernfe H. Lawrence $2,772.00, which
amount represents 33% of his temporary totajL compensation for the period
February 18, 1986, through October 20, 1986; said benefits to be paid in a
lump sum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendants, Gann Brothers, Inc., and/or
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, pay LaVerne|H. Lawrence compensation at the
rate of $215.00 per week for 10.296 weeks1 or a total of $2,213.64, as
compensation for a 3.3% permanent partial impairment of the whole person due
to the industrial accident of September 10, 1985; these benefits to be paid in
a lump sum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Workers Compensation
Lennard Stillman, attorney for the Applicant, $3,016.20, for
in this matter, the same to be deducted from the aforesaid
and temporary total compensation awards to the! A3 .leant and
to his office.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah
shall pay all medical expenses incurred as the result of the surgery of March
20, 1986, in full in the first instance, with reimbursement to be had from he
Uninsured Employers Fund for 6 7^ of those surgical expenses. The reimbursement
from the Uninsured Employers Fund shall be had upon the submission of a
petition by the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah to the Administrator of the
Uninsured Employers Fund indicating the amount expended by the Fund on behalf
of Mr. Lawrence as a result of his surgery of March 20, 1986.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Administrator of the Uninsured
Employers Fund prepare the necessary vouchers to pay LaVerne H. Lawrence
$5,628.00, which amount represents 6 7% of the temporary total compensation for
the period February 18, 1986, through October 20, 1986; these benefits shall
be paid in a lump sum
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Administrator of the Uninsured
Employers Fund prepare the necessary vouchers to pay LaVerne H. Lawrence
compensation at the rate of $215.00 per week for 20.904 weeks for a total of
$4,494.36, as compensation for a 6.7% permanent partial impairment of the
whole person due to the industrial accident of November 29, 1985; these
benefits to be paid in a lump sum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Uninsured Employers Fund shall have
full rights of subrogation against Gann Brothers, Inc., for benefits paid in
this matter, pursuant to Section 35-1-107, Utah Code Annotated.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Gann Brothers, Inc., shall also be liable
for payment of attorney's fees in this matter in the minimum amount of
$250.00, with additional attorney's fees to be granted upon petition of the
Uninsured Employers Fund to the Administrative Law Judge.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, Gann Brothers, Inc., shall
also pay the Uninsured Employers Fund a penalty of 15% of the total award in
this matter as required by Section 35-1-107, Utah Code Annotated.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof,
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

Timotlw^r^Allen
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law Judge
Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
'' ~~ day of March, 198 7.
ATTEST:

^f^/fy^r^&f
Linda J . Stcasburg
Coircmissiaiv S e c r e t a r y

y
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILINd

I certify that on March "
1)987, a copy of the attached
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, in the case of LaVeme H.
Lawrence, issued March 4~~ 1987, was mailed to the following persons at the
following addresses, postage paid:

LaVeme H. Lawrence, 17 74 North 350 West, Sunset, UT 84015
^Lennard
84111

Stiliman, Atty., 211 South State, Suite :;:, SLC, UT

Elliot Morris, Atty., Workers Compensation
South 300 East, SLC, UT 84111

Fund of Utah, 560

Erie V. Boorman, Administrator, Seccbnd Injury Fund
Susan Fixton, Administrator, Uninsured Employers Fund
Gann, 3rothers, Inc., 1070 West 146D0 South, Bluffdale, UT

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

By .• 3^h* . is.
Wi lma
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84065

Blame C Palmer, Director
Pocnev C Smith Assistant (Director

Workers
Compensation
Funds1,,

560 Soutn 300 East
Post Office Box J5-J20
San Laxe G:v. Utan 8*1 -5-0-20
(8CD 533-733-i

0/
Utah

March 5, 1937
EXHIBIT "B"

Timothy C. Allen
numi ni s t r a
Industrial Commission of Utah
150 East 3CC South
Salt Laxe City, Utah 8^i45-0580

Re: Claimant:
File No.:
Inj Date:
Employer:
Case No.:

Laverne Lawrence
86-03153
09-10-35, 11-29-35
Gann Brothers
35000369 & 35000*7!

.en:
I'm beginning to sound like a broken record (perhaps a voice crying in the
wilderness), but not wanting to be inconsistent (even though, according to
Emerson, such a desire might brand me as being among the feeble minded) I am
writing to request a reconsideration or review of your apportionment of
compensation benefits in your March 4, 1987 Order in this matter.
Actually, I'll settle for a modification of your order along the lines of
my alternative argument below, but in order to preserve the issue should an
appeal be necessary, I thought I ought to raise my standard objection to
apportionment anyway. As you know, I am the last of a dying breed of
practitioners in the area of
the Brown, Mountain States Steel , and Anderton decisions still outlaw
apportionment of disability compensation between insurance carriers in serial
accident situations. My tenacity in clinging to this doctrine promises to be
either vindicated or ridiculed in the pending case of Lamp v. Jordan Scnool
District, et al. Until that landmark decision is rendered my head snail
remain bloodied, but unbowed.
("The way of a fool is right in his own
eyes..." Proverbs 12:15)
I shall not trouble you with citations to the
aforementioned authorities as these are well known to you but would merely ask
that you note my manifold and enlightened arguments against apportionment in
the GiIbert Lamb case which are incorporated herein by reference. Needless to
say, you should have made the Uninsured Employers Fund and the Second Injury
Fund D a v the entire 10% PPD rating along with all of the TTC.
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I am well aware that the non-aoportionment rujle is hard stuff to swallow.
By adhering to these tenets, I do not endear myslelf to Susan Pixton and Erie
Boorman. Bur ar rhe risk of seeming to comoromise my unaeviating devcricn to
Brown, Mountain States Steel , and Anderton, I nereby submit an alternative
position whicn I would ask you to consider. Thi s, of course, is none other
than the rule set forth in that recent Utah| Supreme Court decision in
Richie'd Ca r e Cente r v. Tc^ie^so 0 , Mo. 20^12,
ed February 12, 1937. Us^ng
recuires m a r the 3.3% PPI
m e anaiysis nan c a re Q cy rne ^c^r i n T^^c^r
assesses to tne Septemoer 10, 193 accicenc oe considered as a preexisting
i I! . Lopacity
C
.19 Ncvemoer 29, 1 35 accicent for purccses of
ar the r;me of
Hence, the TTC a^ter the last accident should be
applying Section oy.
apportioned 2/3 to the Uninsured Employers Fund and 1/3 to the Second Iniurv
Fund. Uncer this alternative position, the Workers Compensation Fund would
net contest payment of the PPQ attributable to th£ September 10/1985 accident.
I appreciate your consideration of this Moti|on for Reconsideration/Review
albeit its humble form. Ycur indulgence is all the more admirable when one
censide^s the insufferableness o^ dogmatic z\ alots like myself (although
someone else in the office has suggested it rakes one to know one).
Very truly yours,
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH

Elliot K. Morri s
Attorney t Law

cc: ^ennard Stillman, Atty., 211 S. State, #303L SLC, UT 8*111
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator, Second Injury Fund
Susan Pixton, Administrator, Uninsured Employers Fund
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Johnson § Stillman
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

12 Exchange Place
Salt Laxe City. Utah 84111
Phone\SO1)364-7363
EXHIBIT "C"
LeRoy K Johnson
LennardW Stillman

Marcn 18, 1937

Timcthv C. Allen
i-.cmi ni s er a n ve
33 5 G
Re:

Claimant:
In^ Gate:
Hire lev:

L a v e m e Lawrence
9/10/33, 11/29/85
Gars'. 3rorr.srs
86C00369 & S60004~5

Dear Judce Allen:
DI ^.^c^ accent e m s noes as a reruese r c r reconsideration cf vcur
Crder entered m ene L a v e m e Lawrence maeeer on Mar en 4, 1987. Z muse ea.<e
sore exception to ene Crder sneered and enae excepeion is m agreement witn
enae provided to ycu cy El lice Morris of ene Werners' Compensation Find.
In m s leeeer of Marcn 5, 1937, Mr. Morris correcely refers eo ene case cf
Ricnfield Care Geneer v. Torgerson, 52 UAR 22, w m e n appears eo presene ene
appropriaee resolueicn cf ene Lawrence case. In tnae case, tne serial accider.es
were noe considered tcgeener, nowever, were considered to be separaee m c i d e n e s
in time and tne firse incident: was considered, for tne purposes of paying
on tne second m c i d e n e , a pre-existing ccndieion. Thae case appears eo presene
a new rule for a dispcsieion of e m s particular type of case. As an a l e e m a e i v e
resolution of e m s matter, I mignt propose screening along tne following
lines:
According eo ene medical panel, Mr. Lawrence had a 15% wnole person
rating due eo pre-existing conditions prior eo ene injury of Septenoer* 10, 1985.
Adopting the Torgerson rule for tne purposes cf the Novemcer 29," 1985 accident,
tne Septemoer 10 accident is also a "pre-existing condition". Therefore,
implementing Section 69 tne appropriaee ruling would, no deduce ce, enae as
of Ncvemoer 29 accident daee Mr. Lawrence nad a 15% wnole man impairment,
as well as a 3.3% wnole rran impairment due to tne Septemoer 10 accident.
The Novemoer 29 accident would constitute a "significant aggravation" of
his pre-existing condition, tnae condition w m e n existed pricr to tne
Novemoer 2 9 , 1985 accident. Insofar as tne Novemoer 29 incident created
a 6.7% permanent partial impairment, it snould be indisputable tnat that
constitutes a significant aggravation of a pre-existing condition. A d c o t m g
tne Torgerson rule as well as tne accurate analysis of"tne situation bv"
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Reconsideration
Laveme Lawrence
Pace 2

En?lovers Fund, should be responsible for 6-7% permanent partial impairment
due to the industrial accident of November 29, 1985. i
I have no prcblsrs with the temporary total compensation order,
nor do I have problems with the order requiring Gann Brothers, througn the
Uninsured Employers Fond, to pay 6.7% permanent partial impairment. But,
it is apparent: that adopting Tcrgerscn the Second Injury Pond as well as
tne Workers' Compensation Fond of "Jtan are responsible to pay for his
w-r^Xlai—.u

u C i . w —wi.o

o.a w_

„,C ^—..A-nrlT ^,!J , . ^ o ^ .

.fl*s sx»u.w _o

. <c a . r w - w ~ — C L - C

analysis cf Forcerscn as well as Section 53, as well as the rationale behind
the enactment cf tne paying schedule for the Second Injury Fund, to wit:
that employers should be encouraged to retain people who have experienced
injuries on the job or are otherwise handicapped. That was Mr. Lawrence's
condition as cf November 29, 1985.
Resoectful 1 v submitted,

cc:

Workers' Compensation Fund
Second Injury Fund
Uninsured Employers Find
Laveme Lawrence
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MOTION FOR REVIEW

On or about March 4, 1987, an Order was entered by an Administrative
Law Judge of the Commission wherein benefits were awarded in the above
entitled case.
On or about March 9, 1987, the Commission received a Motion for
Review from the Defendants, Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, by and through
their attorney.
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the entire
review pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code Annotated.
has reviewed the file in the above entitled case and we are
that the Motion for Review should be denied and the Order of
tive Law Judge affirmed. In affirming, the Commission adopts
Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Administrative Law Judge.
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Order of the Administrative Law
Judge of March 4, 1987, shall be, and the same is hereby, affirmed and the
Motion for Review shall be, and the same is hereby, denied.

X

^V,L\
V3tw<W;
Stebhen M. Hadley
Chairman

<22L±^<
Lenic^e L. Nielsen
Commissioner

Johjtf Florez
Com^ ^ i o n e r

Passed by t h e I n d u s t r i a l Coinmission
of Utah, S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah, t h i s
/^ ^

_day of Sarch, 1987.

Linda J . , ^ & t f r a s b u r g S /
Commission Secretary

j
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certiry that on -4tereh
^
1987, a copy of the attached
Denial of Motion for Review, in the case of LaVerne Lawrence, issued
Tj&gs-a
^ L 1987, was mailed to the following persons at the following
addresses, postage paid:

LaVeme H. Lawrence, 1774 North 350 West, Sunset, UT 84015
--Lennard Stiliman, Atty., 211 South State, Suite 303, SLC, UT
84111
Elliot Morris, Atty., Workers
South 300 East, SLC, UT 84111

Compensation Fund

of Utah, 560

Erie V. Boorman, Administrator, Second Injury Fund
Susan Pixton, Administrator, Uninsured Employers Fund
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On March 4, 1987, an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial
Commission issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order awarding
benefits to the applicant in the above-captioned case. Two 1985 industrial
accidents were at issue. Both accidents occurred while the applicant was
employed with the defendant Gann Brothers. Gann Brothers was insured by the
Workers Compensation Fund for the first accident (September 10, 1985) and was
uninsured for purposes of the second accident (November 29, 1985).
The
Administrative Law Judge awarded impairment related to the first accident to
be paid by the Workers Compensation Fund (3.3%) and impairment related to the
second accident to be paid by the Uninsured Employers Fund (6.7%). No award
was made by the Administrative Law Judge for the 15% permanent partial
impairment which pre-existed both injuries.
The Administrative Law Judge
found that the pre-existing impairment was not aggravated by and did not
aggravate either of the industrial accidents. Also, the Administrative Law
Judge found that neither industrial accident resulted in 10% impairment.
Because there was no aggravation, and because the 10% industrial impairment
threshold was not met, the Administrative Law Judge found that U.C.A. 35-1-69
did not provide for an award for the pre-existing impairment out of the Second
Injury Fund.
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On March 17, 1987, the attorney for the Workers Compensation Fund
filed a Motion for Review objecting to the Administrative Law Judge's
apportioning the permanent partial impairment benefits between the Workers
Compensation Fund and the Uninsured Employers Fund.
The attorney for the
Workers Compensation Fund contends that this method of awarding benefits
constitutes unauthorized apportionment of compensation between carriers. On
March 18, 1987, the attorney for the applicant filed a Motion for Review
agreeing with the Workers Compensation Fund's Motion for Review and also
contending that the Administrative Law Judge should have awarded permanent
partial impairment benefits out of the Second Injury Fund for the 15^
permanent partial impairment which pre-existed both industrial injuries. On
April 1, 1987, the Industrial Commission issued an Order denying the Workers
Compensation Fund's Motion for Review but neglecting to mention the Motion for
Review filed by the applicant.
On April 24, 1987, the attorney for the
applicant filed a Request for Ruling on the applicant's Motion for Review.
The Commission agrees that the issue regarding Second Injury Fund
benefits has not been ruled on by the Commission. In the applicant's Motion
for Review, the attorney for the applicant argues that the recent Supreme
Court ruling in Richfield Care Center vs Tor%erson. 52 Utah Adv. Rep. 22
(1987) requires that in adjudicating several accidents at one time, impairment
related to a prior accident becomes pre-existing impairment for purposes of
the following accident or accidents. The attorney for the applicant goes on
to state that as result of this general principal, the Administrative Law
Judge should have awarded benefits for the permanent partial impairment
related to the condition pre-existing both industrial injuries.
The
Commission
agrees
with
the
Tor%erson
rational
regarding
impairment due to one accident becoming pre-existing impairment for purposes
of a following accident.
However, the Commission disagrees that this
principal causes the Second Injury Fund to be liable for the 15X permanent
partial impairment which pre-existed the two industrial accidents.
The
Torgerson case discusses only how to apportion liability for compensation
between the Second Injury Fund and a workers compensation insurance carrier
where several accidents are being adjudicated at once. The Court does not
discuss when the Second Injury Fund will be found liable for any pre-existing
impairment that may exist.
Second Injury Fund liability for pre-existing
impairment is ruled by U.C.A. 35-1-69. That statute provides that there must
be aggravation of the pre-existing impairment or certain threshold precentages
must result before the Second Injury Fund is liable to pay for the permanent
partial impairment related to the pre-existing condition.
In the instant
case, the Administrative Law Judge found no aggravation per the Medical Panel
Report (see Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, page 3, last two
sentences in second paragraph) .
As there was no aggravation of the
pre-existing impairment, U.C.A. 35-1-69 states the Second Injury Fund would be
liable for that pre-existing impairment only if the industrial injury caused
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at least 10% permanent partial impairment.
tn looking at each accident
separately or serially, as done by the Supreme Court in the Torgerson case,
neither the September 11, 1985 accident, nor the November 29, 1985 accident
caused permanent partial impairment amounting to 10%.
As the threshold
percentage is not met, no Second Injury Fund liability results. Consequently,
the Commission must deny the applicant's Motion ^or Review requesting an award
of permanent partial impairment out of the Second Injury Fund.

ORDER:

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's March 18, 1987 Motion
for Review is denied and the Commission Order affirming the Administrative Law
Judge's March A, 1937 Order, is hereby affirmed.

Eenice L. Nielsen
Commissioner

John Edorez
Corraaissicner

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
J?^***
day of June, 1987.
ATTEST:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on June J2 4/ . 1987, a copy of the attached ORDER
DENYING MOTIOM FOR REVIEW in the case of LAVERME H. LAWRENCE was mailed to the
following persons at the following addresses, postage paid:

Laveme H. Lawrence
1774 North 350 West
Sunset, UT 84015
REMAILED JUNE 6, 1987 TO:
Lennard Stillnan
Lennard stillman
Attorney at Law
^trorney at Lav
211 South State, Suite 303 12 EXCHANGE PLACE
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
SIC UT 8 U 1 1
Elliot Morris
Attorney at Law
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah
P.O. Box 45420
SLC, UT 84145-0420
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator
Second Injury Fund
Suzan Pixton, Administrator
Uninsured Employers Fund
Timothy C. Allen
Administrative Law Judge
Janet L. Moffitt
Administrative Law Judge
Richard G. Sumsion
Administrative Law Judge
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